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Abstract: 
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1. Introduction 
The potential effect of public debt on government bond yields is an important issue for 
economists and policy makers. If government bond yields include risk premiums, 
increasing indebtedness may cause bond yields to go up, thus raising the cost of 
borrowing and imposing discipline on governments. Market discipline of this kind may 
be especially relevant and important in a monetary union, such as the US or the new 
European Monetary Union (EMU), in which the governments of the member states can 
issue debt, but do not have the possibility to monetize and inflate away excessive debts. 
Whether such risk premiums can be identified empirically and how large they are 
has attracted considerable interest in recent literature. A first line of research estimates 
the effect of fiscal variables on interest rate levels. Gale and Orszag (2002), in a 
comprehensive review of the evidence for the US, conclude that expected deficits affect 
long-term interest rates positively, a result confirmed by Laubach (2003, 2004) and Gale 
and Orszag (2004). In a similar vein, Canzoneri et al. (2002) show that expected deficits 
affect the spread between long and short term interest rates in the US. Faini (2004) 
estimates a positive impact of government debt on ex-post real interest rates in 10 
European countries. Ardagna, Caselli, and Lane (2004) use a panel of 16 OECD 
countries over several decades and both static and dynamic econometric models. They 
find a significant positive effect of primary deficits on long-term interest rates. They also 
find a non-linear effect of government debt on interest rates: Only when countries have 
above-average debt ratios does an increase in the debt ratio cause the interest rate to rise. 
As explained by Gale and Orszag (2002), however, there are many reasons why interest 
rates may respond positively to rising government debts and deficits, and an increase in 
sovereign risk premiums is just one of them. Therefore, looking at the response of 
interest rate levels does not necessarily yield evidence of how markets price sovereign 
risk. 
In view of this, a second line of research uses interest rate spreads between 
government bonds and suitable benchmark assets to estimate risk premiums related to 
fiscal performance. Goldstein and Woglom (1991), Bayoumi, Goldstein and Woglom 
(1995) and Poterba and Rueben (1997) find that the yield differentials of 39 US states 
relative to New Jersey depend positively on their levels of debt. Lemmen (1999) uses 
yields of bonds issued by state governments in Australia, Canada, and Germany and 
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shows that yield spreads over central government bond yields depend positively on the 
ratio of government debt to GDP. Booth et al. (2006) find that bond yield spreads of 
Canadian provinces over the federal government respond positively to measures of 
provincial indebtedness. Since these papers relate to subnational government debt, 
however, it is not clear what they tell us about the sovereign risk of national 
governments. Balassone et al. (2004) show that yields spreads against Germany of 
government bonds issued by the other EU countries in their national currencies between 
1980 and 2003 depend positively on the change in the government debt-to-GDP ratio. 
Using issues in national currencies, however, they cannot distinguish between credit risk 
and exchange rate risk, which is no longer relevant in the European Monetary Union. To 
avoid this problem, Lonning (2000) compares the yields of a very small sample of DM 
issues of 11 EU governments with equivalent German government bonds in the mid-
1990s and finds a positive, though not always significant impact of government debt and 
deficits. Gómez-Puig (2005b) uses adjusted spreads of the yields on bonds issued by 10 
European countries over DM bonds, where the adjustment uses appropriate swap rates to 
eliminate exchange rate uncertainty, and finds that the spreads increase with increasing 
debt relative to Germany.  
Alesina, De Broeck, Prati and Tabellini (1992) use data from 12 OECD countries 
and show that the differential between public and private bond yields is positively related 
to the level of public debt. In a similar vein, Lemmen and Goodhart (1999) and 
Codogno, Favero and Missale (2003) show that the differential between government 
bond yields and the corresponding swap yield of the same maturity depends positively on 
the level of public debt, while Heppke-Falk and Hüffner (2004) find that expected 
deficits have a positive impact on this differential in Germany, France, and Italy. It is not 
clear, however, that this differential properly reflects sovereign risk, since the credit risk 
of private issuers is likely to be correlated with the credit risk of their governments. 
This paper falls into the latter line of research and makes three contributions to 
this literature. First, we use a new data set consisting of yield-at-issue spreads between 
DM (Euro after 1999) and US$ denominated bonds issued by several EU governments 
and Germany or the US government, respectively. Thus, we treat Euro-denominated debt 
issued by governments of EMU member states as foreign-currency debt of these 
countries. This data set has several advantages compared to those used in earlier studies. 
Looking at DM (Euro) and US$ denominated bonds avoids the problem of exchange rate 
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risk that arises in the comparison of bonds denominated by governments in their national 
currencies. Furthermore, the comparison of spreads on such issues is not distorted by 
differences in national tax regimes. Looking at yields-at-issue assures the comparability 
of yields at different points in time, since, in contrast to average yields on debt 
outstanding, the residual maturity is always the full maturity and the bonds are actively 
traded on the day when the yields are recorded. Finally, we consider bonds issued by 
national governments which allows us to consider sovereign risk at the national rather 
than the subnational level. 
Our second contribution is that we use data from before and after the start of 
EMU. This allows us to estimate directly the effects of monetary union on the risk 
premiums paid by European governments. A priori, these effects are ambiguous. 
Monetary union may increase the default risk of member governments, since the latter 
have surrendered their monetary sovereignty and, therefore, the possibility to monetize 
their debts, and other governments and the monetary union’s central bank may not be 
compelled to rescue governments in financial crises. This presumption is in line with the 
“No bail-out clause” of the Maastricht Treaty and the historical experience that state 
governments in the US have defaulted on their debts. However, monetary union may also 
have reduced the perceived default risk, if markets anticipate that member governments 
in fiscal troubles will be bailed out by other governments or the central bank. 
Our third contribution is that our empirical analysis distinguishes between risk 
premiums and liquidity effects in the bond market. Identifying the liquidity component 
of yield spreads is important, because it points to a lack of financial market integration 
rather than differences in fiscal positions as a source of yield differentials.1 Empirically, 
we observe that German government bond yields are still below those of bonds issued by 
governments with much better debt positions. This has been interpreted as showing that 
bond yields do not reflect fiscal performance appropriately (Reuters, June 2002). But the 
fact that German bonds enjoy a yield advantage compared to others may instead be due 
to the size of the German bond market and the fact that German bonds can be traded 
immediately at lower transaction costs and with a smaller risk of price changes due to 
individual transactions.  
                                                 
1 For evidence on liquidity premiums in European bond markets see Blanco (2001), Codogno et al. (2003), 
and Gómez-Puig (2005a). 
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Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a discrete-time, two-asset 
portfolio model explaining interest rate differentials between bonds issued by two 
different governments. It serves to motivate the empirical analysis and derive the 
reduced-form equation estimated subsequently. Section 3 describes the data we use for 
the estimation. Section 4 reports the estimation results, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. A Portfolio Model of Bond Yield Differentials 
2.1. The Basic Model 
Consider a domestic investor maximizing a utility function that depends positively on 
expected real wealth, Et [wt+1] and negatively on its variance, Vart [wt+1]: 
   Max U {Et [wt+1], Vart [wt+1]}, U1 > 0, U2 < 0.          (1) 
The investor allocates a fraction θ of his real wealth wt to a domestic security D and a 
fraction of 1-θ  to a foreign security F. Both securities and real wealth are priced in the 
foreign currency, so that: 
   θt wt = Dt               (2) 
   (1 - θt) wt = Ft               (3) 
We assume that the domestic security is subject to default risk, while the foreign asset is 
considered risk-free. More specifically, with a positive probability of 1-P(xt), 0≤ P(xt)≤1, 
the domestic government will be unable to fully serve its debt. Here, xt indicates a set of 
variables affecting this probability. In the case of default, the investor receives a fraction 
τ of his gross payment, τ ∈ [0, 1 + r), where r is the interest rate on the domestic bond. 
Investors incur transaction costs proportional to their investment in bonds which 
decrease with the liquidity of the bond market. We assume that the foreign bond has 
benchmark status in the bond market, i.e., the foreign bond is considered to be more 
liquid than the domestic bond.  Expected wealth then is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ttttttttttttttt wrlwxPwxPwrwE  1 11 1 *1 θθθτθ −++−−++=+ ,             (4) 
where an asterix in the equation indicates the corresponding foreign variables, l is the 
expected transaction cost for trading the domestic bond Dt, while the transaction cost  for 
the foreign bond Ft is normalized to zero.  The objective function and the budget 
constraint for a representative investor in the foreign country are analogue to the 
equations (1) and (2) of the domestic investor. We assume no discrimination between 
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domestic and foreign investors in the case of default, τ = τ*. The foreign investor’s 
expected real wealth is: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) *********t* 1  1 11 1 ttttttt wrlwxPwxPwrwE ttttttt θθθτθ −++−−++=+           (5) 
Due to the uncertain investment return of domestic securities, the variance of next 
period's real wealth of the domestic and the foreign investor is non-zero and given by: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )ttttttt xPxPrwwVar −−+=+ 11)( 2221 τθ ,                      (6) 
for the domestic investor and  
( ) ( ) ( )( )tttttt xPxPrwwVar t −−+=+ 11)( 22*2** 1 τθ            (7) 
for the foreign investor. Utility maximization yields the optimal shares invested in 
domestic securities, tθˆ  and *ˆtθ : 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )ttttt
tttttt
t xPxPr
rlxPrxP
−−+Φ
+−−−++=
11
111ˆ
2
*
τ
τθ ,                      (8) 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )ttttt
tttttt
xPxPr
rlxPrxP
t −−+Φ
+−−−++=
11
111ˆ
2*
*
*
τ
τθ ,           (9) 
where 12 /2 UUwtt −=Φ and *1*2** /2 UUwtt −=Φ  denote the coefficients of relative risk 
aversion for the domestic and the foreign investor. 
Let S be the total supply of bonds issued by the domestic government. Bond 
market equilibrium requires: 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
Φ+Φ−−+
+−−−++=+= *
*
2
*
*
11
111
t
t
t
t
tttt
tttttt
ttt
ww
xPxPr
rlxPrxPDDS τ
τ ,                (10) 
where Dt* denotes the amount of domestic bonds held by the foreign investor. This can 
be solved for the interest rate differential: 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )ttttt tttttttttttt rww xPxPrSrlrxPrrr +Φ+Φ −−++++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−−=+
−
1//
11
11
11
1 **
2* ττ .       (11) 
In what follows, by the interest rate spread or differential, we mean the term on the left 
hand side of the equation. 
Equation (11) separates the yield spread between the two bonds into three terms. The 
first term on the right hand side reflects the default risk premium. It depends positively 
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on the default probability of the risky issuer country, (1 - P(xt)). The default risk 
premium decreases with an increase in the fraction of repayment the investor receives in 
case of default,τ. Since τ ranges between 0 and (1 + rt), the default risk premium is 
always positive. 
Second, the bond yield differential depends on the liquidity premium. The more 
liquid the domestic bond, the smaller will be this premium. 
The third term is the country-specific risk premium. It depends negatively on τ 
and positively on the variance of the default probability P(xt)(1 - P(xt)), the gross 
nominal return (1 + rt), and the level of the relative risk aversion of investor Φ and Φ*. 
The more investors care about the variance of their future wealth wt+1 (the larger U2), the 
larger will be the interest rate differential between the risky and the risk-free country. 
Furthermore, the country specific risk premium increases with the total supply of 
domestic bonds, S, relative to total wealth. 
 
2.2. The Reduced-form Equation 
To test this model empirically, we estimate the following equation: 
( ) ititittit
it
jtit zEMUz
r
rr εμλδδγββ +++++Φ++=+
− '
10
'
10
*
1
       (12) 
The dependent variable is the yield spread between a bond issued in EU country i and the 
benchmark country j, both denominated in the same currency. zit is a vector containing 
several variables related to fiscal performance, an indicator of the cyclical stance of the 
economy, a liquidity variable, and a maturity variable. 
The fiscal variables reflect the government's quality as a borrower. We use three 
fiscal variables in our regression. The first two are motivated by their common use in 
policy debates and the Maastricht Treaty. These are the debt/GDP ratio and the 
deficit/GDP ratio. Note that deficits are defined as positive numbers. The third is the 
ratio of government debt service to current government revenues. This variable is closer 
in spirit to measures of borrower quality commonly used in corporate finance, such as 
the ratio of debt service (including redemptions of maturing debt) to cash flow. It allows 
for the fact, neglected in the use of GDP as the denominator, that governments in 
different countries may differ in their ability to raise taxes from a given volume of GDP, 
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and it focuses on the constraint high debt burdens impose on the annual budgetary flows. 
All three fiscal variables relate to the general government. They are measured as the 
difference relative to the benchmark country, Germany (the US) in the case of DM 
(Euro) bonds (in the case of US$ bonds). We include levels and quadratic terms of the 
fiscal variables to allow for non-linear relationships.2 
The inclusion of an indicator of the cyclical stance follows a suggestion of 
Alesina et al. (1992) that default risk depends on the overall economic situation of a 
country. In an economic slow-down, government revenues decrease, and the probability 
of default may rise. It seems likely that such effects relate more to severe recessions and 
strong upswings than to small cyclical movements. Therefore, our indicator takes the 
value 1, when the nominal GDP of a country is more than half a standard deviation 
above its trend (boom), -1 when it is more than half a standard deviation below its trend 
(recession), and 0 otherwise. Using sample standard deviations accounts for the fact that 
the volatility of the business cycle varies substantially across countries. The difference of 
this variable between the issuer and the benchmark country is zero, if both countries are 
in the same cyclical position; it is (-2) and (2), if one is in a strong boom and the other in 
a strong recession, and (-1) and 1 in the case of less severe differences in the cyclical 
stance.3 
The liquidity variable serves to estimate the liquidity premium. Due to the lack of 
appropriate data, we cannot follow the conventional approach of using bid-ask spreads as 
a measure of trading costs in securities markets (Fleming, 2003). However, Gravelle 
(1999) shows that the correlation between bid-ask spreads and the total supply of debt is 
significantly negative. This suggests that the size of the market for a given security has a 
positive effect on its liquidity. In view of this, and assuming that all debt issued by a 
government in a given currency is homogeneous up to maturity, the liquidity premium 
can be expected to be proportional to the ratio of the debt issued by a government in DM 
(Euro) or US$ to the total debt of EU governments issued in DM (Euro) or US$.4 We are 
                                                 
2 Bayoumi et al. (1995) and Flandreau et al (1998) talk about a 'credit punishing' effect, when interest rate 
spreads grow non-linearly with the level of fiscal variables. 
3 We also included the nominal GDP as a linear variable in our regressions, but it turned out to be 
insignificant. Intuitively it makes sense that the yield spread between two countries does not depend solely 
on the issuer’s GDP, but on the relative size of the issuer’s GDP to that of the benchmark countries, 
Germany and the USA. The trend of the individual GDP time series is subtracted for comparability 
reasons. 
4 For DM bonds market, we  calculate the ratio of the outstanding debt of a country to the total DM-
denominated debt of all EU governments except the government of the benchmark country Germany. 
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aware that with an increase in the outstanding amount of government bonds not only the 
liquidity of this market increases, but also the default risk of the issuer country. By 
including the total debt/GDP as a regressor in our estimation equation, we assure that the 
coefficient estimated on our liquidity variable will not be biased towards zero. 5 
The maturity variable contained in vector zit measures the time to maturity of the 
bonds at the time of issue and controls for the possibility that default premiums vary with 
the length of the contract. In this case, an investor receives a compensation for investing 
in long-term bonds instead of buying short-term bonds and rolling them over. 
Our model also suggests that the general investors' risk aversion determines the 
yield spread between countries. This suggestion is supported by empirical observations. 
Dungey et al. (2000) show strong evidence of a common international factor in many 
yield differentials. Deutsche Bank Research (2001) and Copeland and Jones (2001) note 
that interest rate differentials between EMU member countries widened in periods of 
financial crises such as the Russian crisis in 1998 or the Turkish currency crisis in 2001. 
Similarly, Lemmen (1999) observes that the difference between provincial and federal 
yields in Australia, Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the US widened considerably 
after the outbreak of the Asian crisis in 1997 and the Russian default of August 1998. 
Thus, it seems that in periods of global financial crises or uncertainty investors move to 
safer and more liquid assets and that bond yield spreads increase as a result. 
Since investors’ risk aversion is not directly observable, we follow Codogno et al. 
(2003) and Favero (2004) and use the yield spread between low grade US corporate 
bonds (BBB) and benchmark US government bonds as an empirical proxy for global risk 
aversion.6 Figure 1 illustrates the development of this proxy between 1993 and 2005. We 
observe that the yield spread hovered around 130 percentage points during the early 
years of the 90’s. With the burst of the asset price bubble in 1999, and again in 2000, the 
spread increased sharply, illustrating the markets’ increasing skepticism and risk 
aversion in that period. After peaking in November 2002, the yield spread decreased 
continuously and reached its level of the early 1990s again in March 2005. 
                                                 
5 We also used the issue size as an alternative proxy for liquidity, but since this variable shows 
insignificant coefficients, we exclude it from reported regression analysis. 
6 A variable that measures the respective corporate bond spread for the complete Euro area is not available, 
but the empirical literature on sovereign bond spreads of emerging markets shows that spreads are 
sensitive to US risk factors (see, e.g., Barnes et al. (1997), Kamin et al. (1999), Eichengreen et al. (2000)). 
Therefore, data on US corporate-government bond yield spreads can be used as a good proxy for the 
overall investors' risk attitude. 
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Figure 1: Yield Spread between US low grade Corporate Bonds and US Government Bonds 
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To estimate the effects of EMU on yield spreads, we introduce an EMU dummy 
that takes the value of one for the initial 11 EMU member countries starting in 1999 and 
for Greece starting in 2001 and zero otherwise. A significant coefficient on this dummy 
points to a general effect of EMU on yield spreads of all member countries. Furthermore, 
we interact the EMU dummy with the fiscal variables and the liquidity variable to see 
whether EMU has changed the effect of the fiscal variables and market liquidity on 
interest rates. Finally, all regressions are estimated with and without time and country 
fixed effects, λt and μi.7 
 
3. Data Description 
The data on the yield spreads were provided by Capital DATA Bondware, now part of 
the Dealogic Group. We compare central government bonds issued by the 14 EU 
                                                 
7 Canzoneri et al. (2002) point out that is it important to condition on the stance of monetary policy when 
estimating the effects of fiscal policy on interest rates, since monetary policy might react to fiscal policy. 
Since we do not have time series data, as they do, we cannot follow their approach of estimating a VAR 
including monetary policy variables. At the same time, our use of yield spreads on foreign currency issues 
makes this point less relevant, as it seems much less likely that the Bundesbank or the Fed would react to 
the fiscal policy of a different country issuing DM or US dollar denominated debt, and the ECB has often 
stated that it does not react to the fiscal policy of an EMU member state.   
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countries except Luxembourg and by the US federal government between 1993 and 
beginning of 2005. All bonds considered are denominated either in DM (before 1999) 
and Euro (since 1999), or in US$. This assures that interest differentials will be net of 
expected changes in exchange rates and exchange rate risk between currencies. 
The interest differential for the DM (Euro) denominated bonds is measured as the 
difference in the yield to maturity at the time of issue between the national bond under 
consideration and an equivalent German government bond. Similarly, the differential for 
the bonds issued in US$ is the difference to an equivalent US government bond. Capital 
DATA Bondware defines equivalence as meaning that the German or US benchmark 
bond is similar to the government bond under consideration with respect to the time of 
issuance, the coupon payment structure, the underlying currency, and the time to 
maturity. The whole data set consists of 106 DM (Euro) and 152 US$ bond issues. 48 of 
these DM (Euro) denominated bonds and 75 of the US$ denominated bonds were issued 
before the start of EMU.8  
Figures A1 – A2 in the Appendix plot the yield spreads of EU government bond 
issues over time. Both figures show a cyclical pattern of European bond yields. Between 
1993 and 1997, the bond yields of all EU countries except Greece converged to German 
and US levels. Between 1997 and 2001, one observes a general divergence of EU 
interest rates relative to German and US levels, the only exception is again Greece, 
which interest rate levels continued declining after 1997. After 2001, interest 
differentials across EU countries seemed to decrease again before another period of 
increases started in 2005 (which, however, falls largely outside the observation period of 
this paper).  
Table A1 in the Appendix gives an overview of the foreign-currency 
denominated bond market in the EU and also reports the shares of DM, Euro, and US$ 
denominated debt outstanding. The data are provided by the DBS-online data bank of the 
Bank of International Settlement (BIS). The table shows that small countries tend to have 
larger shares of outstanding government debt issued in a foreign currency than large 
countries. In 1993, the outstanding amount of foreign-currency denominated debt ranged 
between zero percent in Germany and the Netherlands and 46 percent in Finland. With 
the introduction of the Euro, the share of debt issued in other currencies decreased 
                                                 
8 Recall that, in view of equation (11), all interest differentials are divided by the gross interest rate factor 
of the respective national bond. 
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substantially for all countries except Germany and Italy. In the first quarter of 2005, only 
two EMU countries, Austria and Finland, had more than ten percent of their total public 
debt denominated in a currency other than the Euro, and Denmark and Sweden were the 
two non-EMU countries which had more than ten percent of their total public debt 
denominated in a foreign currency including the Euro.   
Table A1 also shows that the DM (Euro) and the US$ are the most important 
currencies in which the sample countries issued foreign-currency denominated debt 
during the period under consideration. In 1993, more than 40 percent of the outstanding 
foreign-currency debt of the EU countries except Germany and France was denominated 
in one of these two currencies. In Belgium, the UK, and Italy, the share of DM and US$ 
denominated debt securities in total foreign-currency debt was even larger than 60 
percent. This is in line with Cohen (2005), who shows that, before 1999, the US$ and 
DM represented the largest and third largest currency shares in international bond and 
note issuance. As shown in Table A1, the share of US$ denominated government 
securities outstanding increased with the introduction of the Euro in almost all countries 
except France and Portugal. Regarding the non-EMU countries, the UK had switched 
entirely to US$ denominated debt and Denmark almost entirely to Euro-denominated 
debt by 2005. Sweden maintained large shares of her foreign-currency denominated debt 
in both Euro and US$. 
Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix report the shares of the outstanding debt of 
EU countries (except Luxembourg) denominated in DM before 1999 and subsequently in 
Euro and US$ relative to the total debt of EU countries issued in DM (Euro) and US$, 
respectively. Not surprisingly, Germany strongly dominates the DM bond market with a 
share of around 92 percent. With the introduction of the Euro, the market shares in the 
Euro denominated bond market roughly correspond to the size of the EU countries and 
their overall amount of debt outstanding. With 26 percent of the total market, Italy had 
the largest share of Euro denominated debt outstanding in 2005, followed by Germany 
and France with 22 percent and 20 percent, respectively. Regarding the US$ 
denominated bond market, Table A3 shows that Italy had the largest share of all EU 
countries in 2005.  
The corporate yield spreads variable, which measures the difference between 7 to 
10 year low grade corporate bonds (BBB) and 7 to 10 year benchmark government 
bonds in the USA, is provided by Merrill Lynch. All other macro variables like the 
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debt/GDP, deficit/GDP, debt service/revenue are provided by the European 
Commission’s annual data base, Ameco.  
Detailed summary statistics of all variables used in the regressions are reported in 
Table A4 in the Appendix. 
 
4. Estimation Setup and Results 
We estimate two versions of our model, one using the debt ratio and the deficit ratio as 
our fiscal variables, and one using the debt ratio and the debt-service ratio. Furthermore, 
we estimate both version with neither time nor country fixed effects, with time fixed 
effects, and with country fixed effects. 
A number of considerations regarding the estimation setup are warranted. Since we use 
data from two different markets, DM (Euro) and US$ denominated bonds, we first check 
whether we can pool these data to increase the number of observations available for the 
estimation of the model and, thus, improve the quality of the estimates. We use a 
standard poolability test for that purpose. That is, we interact all independent variables of 
equation (12) with a dummy taking the value of one, if a bond is issued in US$, and zero 
otherwise. Next, we estimate the model using data from both markets and including all 
explanatory variables considered together with these interacted terms. In this regression, 
the t-ratios on the interacted terms can be regarded as significance tests of the hypothesis 
that the relevant coefficients are equal in both markets. In view of this, we eliminate the 
interacted variables with the smallest t-ratios in a series of steps until no insignificant 
interactive variables were left. Table A5 in the Appendix shows the order of elimination 
and the t-values of the relevant variables. We also use an F-test of the hypothesis that the 
excluded interactive variables are jointly significant as a summary statistic. This test, 
which is reported in table A5, too, confirms that the restriction of equal coefficients in 
both markets is valid. We reject the hypothesis of poolability only three variables, 
namely the quadratic debt ratio, the debt-service ratio, and our measure of international 
risk-aversion. In the subsequent regressions, we keep these three variables together with 
their interactive terms in the model. Only in one version of the model – regression C 
reported below – we also find significantly different coefficients on the deficit variable 
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between DM (Euro) denominated bonds and US$ denominated bonds. 9 Below, variables 
interacted with the EMU dummy are denoted as “*EMU”, while variables interacted 
with the US dummy are denoted as “*US”. Several terms with consistently very low t-
ratios below one were also dropped from the model at this stage.10 
Since the deficit and debt service contain interest payments by the governments 
and, therefore, could be affected by changes in risk premiums, we perform Durbin-Wu-
Hausman tests for endogeneity of the explanatory variables for each regression.11 The 
results, reported in Table 1 below, indicate that the exogeneity of the deficit variable 
cannot be rejected at standard significance levels. We do, however, reject the exogeneity 
of the debt service variable in all three regressions. In Appendix Table A6, we report the 
result of estimating the model using the debt service variable with an instrumental 
variables estimator and the same instruments we used for the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. 
The instrumental variables estimator changes the magnitude of the coefficients but 
neither their signs nor their significance. In light of this, the following discussion focuses 
on the results using OLS estimation.  
Table 1 reports the estimation results for the pooled data. They indicate, first, that 
a positive relationship exists between yield spreads and the fiscal variables. This suggests 
that markets perceive and price sovereign risk in the European bond market. Second, the 
results show that the start of EMU has changed this relation significantly. 
Consider first regressions A-C, which use public debt and deficits as fiscal 
variables. The coefficients for public debt are significant and robust in explaining yield 
spreads, while the deficit has the right sign but is not significant when the estimations 
include fixed effects. The squared deficit terms, however, are consistently positive and 
significant in these regressions. Thus, rising deficit ratios relative to Germany increase 
yield spreads with an increasing marginal effect. In contrast, the marginal effect for 
higher public debt ratios is slightly declining with higher fiscal imbalances. According to 
regression A, a debt ratio exceeding Germany’s by 10 percent causes a yield spread of 
around 7.7 percentage, while a debt ratio exceeding Germany’s by 30 percent results in a 
                                                 
9 Results for the individual currencies are available from the authors upon request.  
10 These are the business-cycle indicator, debt service, (debt service)2*EMU, (debt) 2*EMU, and 
deficit*EMU. 
11 Following Tujula and Wolswijk (2004), we use the lagged unemployment rate, GDP growth, the 
inflation rate, and the primary deficit, all measured relative to the benchmark country, as instruments for 
the deficit and debt service. Note that we cannot use institutional variables such as measures of fiscal or 
political characteristics of the sample countries as instruments, since such variables do not have sufficient 
time variation.  
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yield spread of 17.1 percentage points. For US$ denominated bonds, the risk premium 
asked by financial markets for an increase in the debt level is somewhat smaller. A debt 
differential to the USA of 10 (30) percent results in an interest differential of 7.3 (13.5) 
percentage points. Neglecting the deficit term and considering the squared deficit term, 
the regression with country fixed effects suggests that a deficit ratio exceeding that of the 
benchmark countries (Germany and the USA) by one percent results in a yield spread of 
0.64 percentage points, while a deficit ratio exceeding that of the benchmark countries by 
2 percent results in a yield spread of 2.56 percentage points. 
The terms interacting the debt ratio and its square with the EMU dummy show 
how this relationship has changed with the beginning of EMU. The coefficient on the 
debt ratio is significantly negative and the coefficient on the squared debt ratio is 
significantly positive. Comparing these coefficients with those on the debt ratio and its 
square reveals that they are almost exactly offsetting in magnitude. In fact, an F-test of 
the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients on debt and debt*EMU and on debt2 and 
debt2*EMU is zero cannot be rejected at standard significance levels. This indicates that, 
since the start of EMU, debt ratios no longer affect yield spreads on bonds issued by 
EMU member states neither in the Euro nor in the US$ market. Similarly, the effects of 
the squared deficit ratio disappear for EMU member countries with the start of EMU. An 
F-test shows that the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients on deficit2 and 
deficit2*EMU  zero cannot be rejected.12 
 Next, consider regressions D - F, which use the debt ratio and the debt service 
ratio as indicators of fiscal performance. The results concerning the debt ratio are similar 
to those in regressions A-C. In addition, we find that the squared debt service ratio has a 
positive and significant coefficient in all three regressions. Thus, a debt service ratio of 
five percent above Germany’s results in a yield spread of 3.75 percentage points, while a 
debt service ratio exceeding Germany’s by 10 percent results in a yield spread of 15 
percentage points. For US$ denominated government bonds, there is an additional, linear 
effect of the debt service ratio. Accordingly, a debt service ratio exceeding that of the US 
by five percent results in a yield spread of 15 percentage points over US federal 
government bonds.   
                                                 
12 The positive coefficient on the term deficit*EMU*US measures the effect of the deficit ratio relative to 
that of the USA in the US$ market after the start of EMU. This coefficient is positive indicating a positive 
effect on the yield spread, but it is significantly different from zero only in the estimation using country 
fixed effects. 
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In contrast to the results for the debt and the deficit ratio, we find that the debt 
service ratio gains importance with EMU. This is indicated by the positive and 
significant coefficients on the term interacting the debt service ratio with the EMU 
dummy. Our estimates did not indicate that the coefficient on the squared debt service 
ratio changed with the start of EMU. Thus, after the start of EMU, a debt service ratio of 
five percent above Germany’s results in an interest spread of 31.9 percentage points in 
the Euro-denominated bond market, while a debt service ratio exceeding that of the US 
by five percent results in a yield spread of 46.8 percentage points over US federal 
government bonds. 
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Table 1: Estimation Results for pooled DM (Euro) and US$ Denominated Government Bond 
 
 
 
 
A B C D E F
Debt 0.87 ** 0.87 ** 0.70 ** 0.32 ** 0.28 * 0.39 **
(3.77) (3.72) (3.83) (2.27) (1.87) (2.81)
Debt2 -0.01 ** -0.01 ** -0.01 ** -0.01 ** -0.01 ** -0.01 **
(-3.43) (-3.25) (-3.68) (-4.46) (-3.94) (-3.31)
Debt2*US -0.004 ** -0.005 ** -0.006 ** -0.004 -0.006 ** -0.005 **
(-2.23) (-2.78) (-2.87) (-1.51) (-2.06) (-2.00)
Debt*EMU -0.73 ** -0.88 ** -0.61 * -0.71 ** -0.64 ** -0.88 **
(-2.53) (-2.89) (-1.88) (-2.57) (-2.24) (-2.37)
Debt2*EMU 0.01 ** 0.01 ** 0.00
(2.13) (2.41) (0.18)
Deficit 1.85 ** 1.24 0.81
(2.53) (1.40) (1.07)
Deficit2 0.81 ** 0.99 ** 0.64 **
(4.18) (4.66) (3.64)
Deficit*EMU*US 0.76 1.16 2.46 **
(0.73) (1.09) (2.43)
Deficit2*EMU -0.60 ** -0.98 ** -0.65 **
(-2.50) (-3.29) (-2.68)
Debt Service*US 2.24 ** 2.31 ** 3.00 **
(2.78) (3.21) (4.92)
Debt Service2 0.15 ** 0.16 ** 0.14 **
(5.97) (6.17) (5.07)
Debt Sevice*EMU 5.63 ** 4.84 ** 6.39 **
(3.18) (2.71) (2.57)
Liquidity -117.09 ** -136.49 ** -62.98 ** -64.66 ** -67.42 ** -44.89
(-2.79) (-2.99) (-2.18) (-2.13) (-2.04) (-1.50)
Liquidity*EMU 115.69 ** 140.59 ** 130.57 ** 59.67 * 76.78 * 104.45 **
(2.81) (3.13) (3.02) (1.71) (1.92) (2.73)
EMU -9.18 -5.43 -8.55 -10.60 ** -12.69 ** -10.63 **
(-1.51) (-0.69) (-1.30) (-2.25) (-2.15) (-2.10)
EMU*US 28.73 ** 25.19 ** 23.85 **
(3.18) (2.85) (2.25)
Corp.-Gov.spread 6.94 -5.21 1.57 6.70 -4.15 2.81
(1.59) (-0.64) (0.28) (1.48) (-0.49) (0.59)
Corp.-Gov.spread*US 28.96 ** 29.43 ** 37.87 ** 30.23 ** 29.46 ** 37.01 **
(4.88) (5.36) (6.43) (4.87) (4.60) (5.69)
Maturity 0.90 ** 1.00 ** 0.58 * 0.76 ** 0.89 ** 0.65 **
(3.31) (3.69) (1.83) (2.75) (3.18) (2.41)
US -14.65 -13.40 -28.19 ** -19.83 * -17.68 * -23.75 **
(-1.26) (-1.29) (-2.68) (-1.92) (-1.70) (-2.39)
Constant 5.48 16.70 9.75 8.76 16.59 6.15
(0.76) (1.22) (1.00) (1.12) (1.15) (0.75)
Country dummies
Time dummies
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test1) 0.79 0.72 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.01
N 236 236 236 236 236 236
r2 0.58 0.62 0.66 0.65 0.69 0.71
yes no
1) Instruments are GDP growth rate, unemployment rate, primary deficit, and inflation rate. 
no yes
no yes no no yes no
no no
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Comparing the two sets of regressions on indicators of fiscal imbalances thus 
suggests a striking change in the way bond market price sovereign risk since the start of 
EMU. Our results indicate that markets pay less attention to the debt and the deficit 
ratios, but they give more weight to the debt service ratio in their assessment of credit 
risk. This would imply that market discipline did not vanish with the start of EMU, but 
that the focus of financial markets changed. A possible explanation is that the debt and 
the deficit ratio are commonly used in European policy discussions and the European 
Commission’s official assessments of the sustainability of the public finances of the EU 
member states. As such, they have become the object of highly politicized debates and 
are subject to creative accounting as governments try to stay within the limits of the 
Maastricht Treaty. 13 Markets may perceive that this has reduced the information content 
of these variables for the governments’ true credit risk.  
Turning to the results for the other variables, our estimates show that yield 
spreads were significantly affected by liquidity premiums before the start of EMU. An 
increase in the relative market size by one percent caused a reduction of the issuer 
country’s interest rate by around one percentage point. This liquidity effect largely 
vanished with EMU, as shown by the positive and significant coefficients on 
Liquidity*EMU. An F-test does not reject the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients 
on Liquidity and Liquidity*EMU is zero. We attribute this result to the fact that, after the 
conversion of all existing government debt of the EMU member states into Euros, the 
market for Euro-denominated debt became much larger for all countries. The result is 
also consistent with an increasing degree of financial market integration in the Europe.14 
Note that, for non-EMU countries, the liquidity premium remains unchanged after the 
start of EMU.  
The negative coefficient of the EMU dummy indicates that average yield 
differentials of EMU member states have declined since the start of EMU, although this 
effect is significant only in the regressions D-F. This decline in spreads indicates a 
reduction in the average risk premiums for EMU members. A first interpretation would 
suggest that investors presume that EMU member countries facing crises will be bailed 
out by other members of the monetary union. However, such an expectation should also 
                                                 
13 On the rise of creative accounting affecting deficits in particular see von Hagen and Wolff (2005) and 
Buti et al (2006).  
14 Similarly, Pagano and von Thadden (2004) conclude that liquidity premiums play only a minor role in 
explaining yield differentials in the Euro area.  
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have reduced the risk premium on US$ denominated debt, for which we find a general 
increase in the spreads after the start of EMU (a positive coefficient on “EMU*US). A 
more plausible interpretation is that, in contrast to DM-denominated debt of countries 
other than Germany in the past and in contrast to US-$ denominated debt even today, 
euro-denominated debt of a euro-area member is denominated in the same currency as its 
tax revenues. While the home-currency value of DM-denominated debt would have 
increased, if a fiscal crisis entailed a devaluation of that currency, and this would have 
aggravated the government’s fiscal problems, this effect does arise under EMU.   
 For US$ denominated bonds, we find a positive and significant effect of the 
Corporate Spread variable in all six regressions. For bonds issued in DM (Euro), only 
regression A suggests that spreads rise with the Corporate Spread variable. Accordingly, 
in periods of high global risk aversion, the interest differentials of EU countries versus 
the USA rise. This confirms the results of Codogno et al. (2003) and Gómez-Puig 
(2005b) and underlines the ‘safe haven’ status of the US government bond market, which 
the DM (Euro) market does not enjoy during our sample period.   
Finally and unsurprisingly, we find that the time to maturity matters for the 
interest differential. With every additional year to maturity, the interest rate increases by 
around one percentage point.15  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the literature on the impact of fiscal policies on interest rates by 
analyzing the role of capital markets on the sustainability of public finances in the 
euroarea. We examine whether government bond yield differentials across EU countries 
are determined by credit risk and liquidity effects, and whether EMU had significant 
impact on bond pricing. We exploit a unique data set of US$, DM, and, after 1998, Euro 
denominated government bond issue spreads between 1993 and 2005, which has the 
advantage that we can ignore exchange risks and distortions by differences in national 
tax regimes. 
Our results show that yield spreads respond significantly to measures of 
government indebtedness both before and after the start of EMU. Interestingly, after the 
                                                 
15 Note that the Business Cycle indicate never had significant coefficients and was therefore dropped from 
the regressions. 
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start of EMU, markets seem to have shifted their attention from government debts and 
deficits as indicators of creditworthiness to debt-service ratios, perhaps reflecting the fact 
that the former have become very politicized in the debates over the fiscal framework of 
EMU. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence suggests that credit markets continue to 
monitor fiscal performance and exert disciplinary pressure on governments. In other 
words, markets do not expect that countries in fiscal troubles will be fully bailed out by 
other countries in the EMU or the ECB.  
Furthermore, yield spreads are affected by liquidity premiums. Countries with 
larger market shares in the DM (Euro) or US$ markets pay significantly lower interest 
rates than EU countries with smaller market shares. In the euro-denominated debt 
market, however, these liquidity premiums have vanished with the start of EMU..   
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Outstanding Amount of Foreign Currency Bonds (continued on next page) 
 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Austria Oustanding amount (in Mill. US$) 18538 24326 29219 28908 26669 33593 27325 23446 22165 26918 30916 33458 31993
    of which DM denominated debt (%) 21.88% 22.20% 25.32% 31.00% 29.80% 27.46% - - - - - - -
    of which US$ denominated debt (%) 22.06% 19.58% 16.48% 14.28% 12.66% 9.76% 18.62% 19.89% 27.75% 28.95% 37.09% 42.90% 50.78%
Oustanding amount/Total Debt 15.90% 18.83% 18.53% 18.19% 19.92% 24.42% 19.27% 18.37% 17.32% 19.64% 18.70% 17.85% 16.21%
Belgium Oustanding amount (in Mill. US$) 15531 18703 20479 15434 15266 12893 9606 8204 6259 4605 3439 2876 2158
    of which DM denominated debt (%) 18.32% 20.45% 21.23% 22.09% 24.85% 23.18% - - - - - - -
    of which US$ denominated debt (%) 45.37% 42.21% 41.90% 45.03% 44.90% 43.47% 43.51% 43.88% 39.94% 43.43% 29.08% 34.77% 46.34%
Oustanding amount/Total Debt 5.06% 5.85% 5.72% 4.43% 4.97% 4.30% 3.33% 3.29% 2.55% 1.78% 1.13% 0.85% 0.61%
Germany Oustanding amount (in Mill. US$) 0 0 0 0 0 0 90 254 292 1714 4317 6080 10551
    of which US$ denominated debt (%) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 94.44% 0.00% 3.42% 0.58% 12.05% 19.42% 59.84%
Oustanding amount/Total Debt 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 0.03% 0.14% 0.28% 0.34% 0.55%
Denmark Oustanding amount (in Mill. US$) 21889 20359 19509 18374 16955 14107 12791 11409 10186 9134 10023 11739 11432
    of which DM denominated debt (%) 8.09% 8.78% 13.51% 21.76% 23.64% 23.90% - - - - - - -
    of which US$ denominated debt (%) 39.02% 34.97% 25.62% 23.10% 23.65% 22.41% 34.50% 43.54% 57.46% 49.15% 30.83% 17.55% 13.65%
    of which Euro denominated debt (%) - - - - - - 4.32% 1.23% 1.30% 18.94% 48.83% 69.33% 82.24%
Oustanding amount/Total Debt 19.47% 17.24% 14.75% 14.44% 15.20% 13.38% 12.84% 13.75% 13.41% 11.19% 10.55% 11.37% 10.71%
Spain Oustanding amount (in Mill. US$) 13103 16001 19636 21528 22433 27529 24042 22126 20748 20411 19475 17200 14205
    of which DM denominated debt (%) 30.06% 26.63% 33.21% 28.71% 28.23% 24.58% - - - - - - -
    of which US$ denominated debt (%) 24.38% 20.24% 17.01% 15.38% 15.43% 17.55% 19.01% 24.61% 30.25% 30.62% 31.27% 32.35% 37.76%
Oustanding amount/Total Debt 4.89% 5.34% 5.31% 5.27% 6.02% 7.25% 6.32% 6.43% 6.12% 5.64% 4.50% 3.55% 2.79%
Finland Oustanding amount (in Mill. US$) 25624 35825 37325 36376 28121 28016 24691 18828 15520 16016 12841 11374 9514
    of which DM denominated debt (%) 18.54% 20.37% 20.56% 20.77% 21.33% 24.75% - - - - - - -
    of which US$ denominated debt (%) 24.80% 25.07% 24.22% 25.68% 16.86% 10.85% 12.32% 15.94% 19.21% 27.47% 33.88% 38.68% 46.25%
Oustanding amount/Total Debt 45.94% 58.26% 51.91% 50.00% 42.90% 44.51% 41.04% 35.21% 29.18% 28.54% 17.50% 13.55% 10.23%
France Oustanding amount (in Mill. US$) 1223 1504 2080 1899 1735 2157 1670 1358 1080 818 894 800 713
    of which DM denominated debt (%) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% - - - - - - -
    of which US$ denominated debt (%) 0.00% 0.00% 9.62% 10.53% 11.53% 9.27% 11.98% 14.73% 18.52% 24.45% 27.96% 31.25% 7.01%
Oustanding amount/Total Debt 0.20% 0.23% 0.24% 0.21% 0.21% 0.25% 0.20% 0.18% 0.14% 0.10% 0.08% 0.06% 0.05%  
 
 
 
 
 24
Table A1: Outstanding Amount of Foreign Currency Bonds (continue) 
 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
UK Oustanding amount (in Mill. US$) 13273 13941 14458 13983 10037 11958 11269 10954 3000 0 3000 3000 3000
    of which DM denominated debt (%) 24.00% 25.47% 26.54% 25.30% 0.00% 0.00% - - - - - - -
    of which US$ denominated debt (%) 52.79% 50.26% 48.46% 50.06% 69.74% 58.54% 62.12% 63.90% 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
    of which Euro denominated debt (%) - - - - - - 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Oustanding amount/Total Debt 3.03% 2.75% 2.46% 2.25% 1.49% 1.76% 1.71% 1.81% 0.54% 0.00% 0.42% 0.34% 0.30%
Greece Oustanding amount (in Mill. US$) 11061 15265 15849 18252 18451 21414 20757 19778 13158 13395 12759 12976 11546
    of which DM denominated debt (%) 11.26% 12.48% 13.86% 18.57% 24.25% 20.16% - - - - - - -
    of which US$ denominated debt (%) 24.19% 22.03% 19.95% 20.94% 19.02% 17.49% 13.19% 12.57% 17.00% 16.70% 14.89% 14.64% 16.46%
Oustanding amount/Total Debt 13.29% 16.43% 13.79% 14.45% 15.48% 17.19% 16.42% 15.46% 9.75% 8.95% 6.73% 5.72% 4.69%
Ireland Oustanding amount (in Mill. US$) 10528 10431 10924 8633 6754 6644 6113 4791 7218 4473 2539 770 639
    of which DM denominated debt (%) 34.57% 31.78% 28.31% 29.68% 24.24% 25.86% - - - - - - -
    of which US$ denominated debt (%) 23.56% 21.57% 20.14% 17.95% 22.95% 23.33% 33.89% 33.40% 62.80% 39.17% 52.82% 24.68% 78.25%
Oustanding amount/Total Debt 21.30% 20.74% 19.18% 15.70% 13.76% 14.32% 13.17% 13.16% 19.48% 11.37% 5.21% 1.42% 1.05%
Italy Oustanding amount (in Mill. US$) 29317 40610 48408 50093 50820 57471 48851 52804 53510 65130 79205 85345 83185
    of which DM denominated debt (%) 9.88% 9.94% 9.01% 8.03% 10.16% 4.52% - - - - - - -
    of which US$ denominated debt (%) 60.85% 43.91% 38.05% 41.82% 41.93% 42.48% 44.57% 47.69% 51.54% 54.20% 56.47% 56.92% 61.95%
Oustanding amount/Total Debt 2.55% 3.16% 3.19% 3.20% 3.63% 4.12% 3.58% 4.42% 4.43% 5.08% 5.07% 4.81% 4.37%
Netherlands Oustanding amount (in Mill. US$) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 225 312 304
    of which DM denominated debt (%) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% - - - - - - -
    of which US$ denominated debt (%) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Oustanding amount/Total Debt 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.08% 0.10% 0.09%
Portugal Oustanding amount (in Mill. US$) 3624 6672 9839 10447 11118 12671 9369 7786 7272 6323 4748 3240 1904
    of which DM denominated debt (%) 31.98% 43.33% 36.78% 38.14% 32.87% 37.03% - - - - - - -
    of which US$ denominated debt (%) 27.59% 14.99% 12.20% 10.19% 11.83% 10.38% 27.76% 30.63% 46.30% 38.75% 24.22% 4.63% 7.88%
Oustanding amount/Total Debt 7.37% 11.88% 14.31% 14.90% 17.85% 20.52% 14.98% 13.72% 11.85% 8.93% 5.36% 3.12% 1.58%
Sweden Oustanding amount (in Mill. US$) 33164 50723 57675 58534 50429 47084 37059 28329 23287 25586 26163 27560 25277
    of which DM denominated debt (%) 8.07% 8.48% 11.66% 12.08% 9.21% 9.46% - - - - - - -
    of which US$ denominated debt (%) 47.11% 42.61% 27.19% 25.85% 32.81% 30.04% 19.96% 19.91% 21.94% 28.22% 26.94% 27.72% 38.23%
    of which Euro denominated debt (%) - - - - - - 8.74% 10.85% 13.32% 15.27% 19.55% 23.97% 27.38%
Oustanding amount/Total Debt 23.16% 32.10% 31.57% 29.43% 28.89% 27.83% 23.51% 22.41% 19.49% 20.13% 16.64% 15.57% 13.70%
Source: Bank of International Settlement (BIS) and own calculations  
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Table A2: Market shares of debt outstanding denominated in DM before 1998 and Euro thereafter in the EU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A3: Market shares of debt outstanding denominated in US$ in the EU 
 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
bel 0.59% 0.78% 0.75% 0.53% 0.59% 0.49% 7.45% 7.50% 7.60% 7.76% 7.59% 7.24% 6.77%
dnk 0.37% 0.36% 0.45% 0.62% 0.62% 0.55% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.05% 0.12% 0.15% 0.15%
deu 93.31% 91.36% 90.96% 91.51% 92.62% 92.29% 18.06% 18.79% 19.49% 20.41% 21.46% 21.99% 22.29%
grc 0.26% 0.39% 0.38% 0.53% 0.69% 0.71% 2.78% 2.83% 2.97% 3.51% 4.08% 4.34% 4.84%
esp 0.82% 0.86% 1.12% 0.96% 0.98% 1.11% 8.82% 8.85% 8.87% 8.63% 8.49% 8.12% 8.03%
fra 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 18.48% 18.37% 18.70% 18.47% 18.42% 19.29% 19.63%
irl 0.76% 0.67% 0.53% 0.40% 0.25% 0.28% 0.71% 0.76% 0.71% 0.61% 0.58% 0.66% 0.70%
ita 0.60% 0.82% 0.75% 0.62% 0.80% 0.43% 33.30% 31.94% 30.73% 29.40% 27.72% 26.90% 26.24%
nld 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.52% 5.49% 5.11% 4.83% 4.67% 4.72% 4.79%
aut 0.84% 1.10% 1.28% 1.39% 1.23% 1.51% 2.18% 2.58% 2.73% 2.83% 2.88% 2.56% 2.51%
prt 0.24% 0.59% 0.62% 0.62% 0.57% 0.77% 1.18% 1.34% 1.44% 1.66% 1.95% 1.94% 2.03%
fin 0.99% 1.48% 1.32% 1.17% 0.93% 1.14% 1.42% 1.47% 1.55% 1.70% 1.92% 1.97% 1.91%
swe 0.56% 0.87% 1.16% 1.10% 0.72% 0.73% 0.09% 0.09% 0.10% 0.12% 0.12% 0.12% 0.11%
gbr 0.66% 0.72% 0.66% 0.55% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
eu 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Source: Bank of International Settlement (BIS) and own calculations
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
bel 9.29% 9.28% 10.91% 8.95% 9.28% 7.75% 6.41% 5.44% 3.58% 2.70% 1.16% 1.11% 0.98%
dnk 11.26% 8.37% 6.36% 5.46% 5.43% 4.37% 6.77% 7.51% 8.39% 6.06% 3.60% 2.28% 1.53%
deu 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.13% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 0.61% 1.31% 6.21%
grc 3.53% 3.95% 4.02% 4.92% 4.75% 5.18% 4.20% 3.76% 3.21% 3.02% 2.21% 2.10% 1.87%
esp 4.21% 3.81% 4.25% 4.26% 4.69% 6.68% 7.01% 8.23% 8.99% 8.43% 7.09% 6.16% 5.28%
fra 0.00% 0.00% 0.25% 0.26% 0.27% 0.28% 0.31% 0.30% 0.29% 0.27% 0.29% 0.28% 0.05%
irl 3.27% 2.65% 2.80% 2.00% 2.10% 2.14% 3.18% 2.42% 6.49% 2.36% 1.56% 0.21% 0.49%
ita 23.52% 20.96% 23.42% 26.96% 28.84% 33.77% 33.42% 38.06% 39.51% 47.64% 52.05% 53.82% 50.68%
nld 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
aut 5.39% 5.60% 6.12% 5.31% 4.57% 4.53% 7.81% 7.05% 8.81% 10.52% 13.34% 15.90% 15.98%
prt 1.32% 1.18% 1.53% 1.37% 1.78% 1.82% 3.99% 3.60% 4.82% 3.31% 1.34% 0.17% 0.15%
fin 8.38% 10.56% 11.50% 12.02% 6.42% 4.21% 4.67% 4.54% 4.27% 5.94% 5.06% 4.87% 4.33%
swe 20.60% 25.41% 19.94% 19.48% 22.40% 19.57% 11.35% 8.52% 7.32% 9.74% 8.20% 8.46% 9.50%
gbr 9.24% 8.24% 8.91% 9.01% 9.48% 9.68% 10.74% 10.58% 4.30% 0.00% 3.49% 3.32% 2.95%
EU 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
Source: Bank of International Settlement (BIS) and own calculations
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Table A4: Variable Description and Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Desciption Average Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Spread Sit
The spread between the yield of a government bond 
issue of an EU country and a comparable goverment 
bond issued in the same currency related to the gross 
nominal return of the government bond issue. 
Expressed in basis points. Compare equation (11). 
Source: Capital DATA Bondware
37.91 30.20 -5.00 198.00
Debt
Difference of debt to GDP outstanding at the end of the 
fiscal year between the issuer country and the 
benchmark country (expressed in percent). Source: 
European Commission (Ameco database)
14.24 28.04 -46.11 91.65
Deficit
Difference of deficit to GDP (including debt service 
payments) at the end of the fiscal year between the 
issuer country and the benchmark country. Source: 
European Commission (Ameco database)
-0.12 3.15 -8.10 10.30
Debt Service
Difference of debt service payments to total revenue in 
the current fiscal year between the issuer country and 
the benchmark country (expressed in percent). Source : 
European Commission (Ameco database)
0.77 6.18 -13.50 28.40
Corp. Spread
Spread between 7 to 10 years low grade corporate 
bonds (BBB) and 7 to 10 government bonds in the US to 
the  time of issuance (expressed in basis points). 
Source: Datastream
1.71 0.44 1.13 2.89
Maturity Time to maturity of the government bond issue measured in years. Source:  Capital DATA Bondware. 7.31 4.93 1.60 32.50
Liquidity
The ratio of the total debt of the issuer country 
denominated in DM (Euro) or US$ over the total debt of 
the EU issued in DM (Euro) or US$.i) Source: 
DBSonline, BIS and own calculations.
13.60 12.88 0.11 53.82
Business Cycle
The difference of the business cycle variable between 
the issuer country and the benchmark county, which 
collates the value 1 when the detrended and 
standardized nominal GDP is bigger than 0.5, the value  -
1, when it is smaller then -0.5 and 0 otherwise.
-0.05 1.05 -2.00 2.00
EMU Dummy variable for all member countries of the EMU after 1998. 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00
i) For the DM bond market, we calculate the ratio of the outstanding debt of a country to the total debt of all EU countries except the benchmark country 
Germany.
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Table A5: Poolability tests 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A B C
Liquidity*US -1.61 -0.73 -1.41
Deficit2*US 0.07 0.44 0.12
EMU*US 0.28 -0.44 0.63
Debt*US 0.97 0.63 0.81
Maturity*US 0.82 1.00 0.69
Deficit*US 0.80 0.09 1.31
Cycle*US 0.71 -1.43 1.58
Debt2*EMU*US -1.28 -1.56 0.12
Debt*EMU*US -0.36 -1.47 0.11
Deficit2*EMU*US -1.22 -1.22 -0.59
Liquidity*EMU*US 1.36 1.19 -0.77
F-test 0.27 0.24 0.57
D E F
liquidity*US -1.03 -0.42 -0.21
Debt*US -0.86 -1.18 -0.54
Maturity*US 1.01 1.19 0.52
Cycle*US 1.05 -1.08 1.81
Debt Service2*US -0.83 -0.77 -0.19
Debt service2*EMU*US 1.11 0.64 1.15
Debt*EMU*US -0.85 -1.27 -1.77
liquidity*EMU*US 0.64 1.87 -1.52
Debt2*EMU*US -1.52 -1.49 -1.62
Debt service*EMU*US 1.32 0.74 -0.40
F-test 0.32 0.32 0.32
Note: Entries in this table record the t-ratios of the poolability tests for 
individual variables and the corresponding overall F-test. Variables denoted 
“*US” are interacted with a dummy for the US$ market. 
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Table A6: Estimation Results of Instrumental Variables 2-Stage Least-Squares Regression 
D E F  
Debt 0.83 ** 0.70 * 1.87 **
(2.05) (1.93) (2.83)  
Debt2 -0.01 ** -0.01 ** -0.01 **
(3.47)        (2.84)        (2.41)         
Debt2*US -0.01 ** -0.01 ** -0.01 **
(2.74)        (3.04)        (2.96)         
Debt*EMU -1.66 ** -1.38 ** 1.92
(2.61)        (2.44)        (1.16)  
Debt2*EMU 0.00 0.00 0.02  
(0.66)        (0.46)        (1.33)  
Debt Service -5.16 * -4.36 * -11.65 **
(1.89)        (1.82)        (2.55)         
Debt Service*US 5.81 ** 5.34 ** 7.83 **
(3.94) (3.86) (3.78)  
Debt Service2 0.32 ** 0.30 ** 0.43 **
(4.30) (4.52) (3.78)  
Debt Sevice*EMU 14.36 ** 11.51 ** -19.19
(2.85) (2.70) (1.25)         
Liquidity -83.57 ** -85.68 ** -58.08  
(2.58)        (2.38)        (1.45)         
Liquidity*EMU 82.75 ** 96.35 ** 3.17  
(2.13) (2.15) (0.05)  
EMU -15.32 ** -15.82 ** -28.75 **
(2.28)        (2.18)        (2.34)         
EMU*US 62.77 ** 51.14 ** -46.68  
(3.04) (3.15) (0.92)         
Corp.-Gov.spread 4.58 -5.04 11.06  
(0.86) (0.57)        (1.16)  
Corp.-Gov.spread*US 34.22 ** 32.42 ** 18.83  
(5.13) (4.63) (1.39)  
Maturity 0.87 ** 0.96 ** 0.67 *
(2.90) (3.34) (1.69)  
US -36.61 ** -30.58 ** -26.82  
(2.88)        (2.46)        (1.21)         
Constant 16.17 * 21.51 41.14 **
(1.85) (1.43) (2.29)  
Country dummies
Time dummies
N 236 236 236  
r2 0.64 0.68 0.55  
1) Instruments are GDP growth rate, unemployment rate, inflation rate, and primary 
deficit.
no no yes
no yes no
IV-Estimator 1)
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Figure A1: DM (Euro) Bond Yield Spreads between 1993-2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A2: US$ Bond Yield Spreads between 1993-2005 
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